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"Because of all that is at stake in the critical period ahead, 
we must reject the well-intentioned but misguided suggestion that 
this is the time to slash America's defenses by cutting billions 
of dollars off our budget for national security." 
President Nixon in a speech aboard the USS INDEPENDENCE in Norfolk, VA. on 
Armed Force Day, 1973. 
EDITORIAL CO~illENT: Representative Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.) presented this very timely and 
provocative speech to the Armed Forces Management Association in Washington on 7 June. 
Pike, a veteran member of the House Armed Services Committee, is a cantankerous friend 
of the military. He fumes at some of the Pentagon's maneuverings but baSically supports 
military budgets and is a proponent of a strong defense. Recently he took the forefront 
in getting the Navy to stop practice firing on the Perto Rican island of Culebra where 
for thirty years the less than 1,000 American citizens living there have been harassed 
by U.S. Navy's weapons training. Despite his serious demeanor, Pike retains a sense of 
humor. His periodic press releases are read regularly by non-constituents who appreciate 
biting satire with serious overtones. 
FEATURE: THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL CO~WLEX REVISITED 
"By way of setting the stage, I would like to read an extract from what I am sure is 
the favorite newspaper of this distinguished audience. "The President has boldly and 
courageously committed this Nation to a great power role in Asia. It is a role for which 
many of his countryment may not be prepared. It is a role from which most of them 
surely would like to escape. It is a role that history would have compelled them to 
disavow or embrace sooner or later ..•• The President's paper is simply a declaratory 
spatement describing the task we have already undertaken-and one that we undertook, if we 
nd~ rightly understood it-the moment that World War II compelled us to assemble the greatest 
fuilitary force in world history. That force and power deprived us of the luxurv of in-
difference toward or isolation of events anywhere in the world." 
Incredulous as it may seem that was a verbatim extract from an editorial which 
appeared in the Washington Post. 
Not yesterday's edition, obviously, but rather the one that came out July 13, 1966, 
not seven years ago. 
Perhaps the secret of remaining abreast of the "Times"-or the "Post"-and garnering 
all those Pulitzer Prizes is not to become overly-rigid in one's thinking. 
Four years ago in presenting to Congress his views on the threat which American military 
power must be prepared to withstand, Secretary Laird described the threat thus -
"While we do not consider aggression by the USSR likely in the present political 
climate, the fact remains that the Soviets have a vital interest in preserving the status 
quo in Central Europe and in retaining their hold on Eastern Europe. A crisis that 
could lead to a conflict could arise if the political situation substantially changed in 
a way that threatened the USSR or its hegemony over Eastern Europe, or if a Soviet 
government saw opportunities for other ways to apply critical pressures on the cohesion 
of the Alliance. Such a crisis could escalate to hostilities." 
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Tremendous changes have taken place since that time. A year ago in February the 
President of the United States accompanied by a full brigade of reporters and television 
cameramen exchanged toasts of hospitality and friendship with Mao Tse Tung and Chou En 
Lai. On year ago last month with another brigade of reporters and cameramen, President 
Nixon visited Moscow and signed an agreement which allegedly limited strategic arms. 
Soviet basketball teams play ours allover America. Chinese gymnasts have replaced 
Chinese ping-pong players as a st"ellar attraction. Russian diplomats lounge in their 
Embassy and Chinese diplomates lounge at the Mayflower. 
These fantastic breakthroughs in our international relations have caused such a 
tremendous re-evaluation over at the Pentagon that this year the Secretary of Defense 
said: "While we do not consider aggression by the USSR likely in the present political ..) 
climate, the fact remains that the Soviets have a vital i interest in preserving the 
status quo in Central Europe and in retaining their hold on Eastern Europe. A crisis 
that could lead to a conflict could arise if the political situation substantially 
changed in a way that threatened the USSR or its hegemony over Eastern Europe, or if a 
Soviet government saw opportunities for other ways to apply critical pressures on the 
cohesion of the Alliance. Such a crisis could escalate to hostilities." 
I can't tell you which Secretary of Defense said it, for I don't remember which week 
it was said, but it's as if the Rip Van Winkles of the Pentagon had not heard about 
anything which has happened in the past four years. 
Our Defense planners really ought to be launching a new talent search for a more 
likely villain to portray in their annual analysis of the military threat. 
Russell Baker, the joker-in-residence with the New York Times, may have inadvertently 
come up with a likely candidate. In a recent column he speculated on the choices open 
to the President to distract the media's obsessive attention away from Watergate. His 
inspired first choice was that the President should bomb France. 
Considering the wariness with which Presidents Pompidou and Nixon faced each other 
on neutral ground up in Iceland last week, this may not be as funny as Baker intended. 
Even the codfish swimming offshore held the promise of doing what France had failed 
to do, that is, break up the NATO alliance, the cornerstone of all U.S. foreign policy. 
The trouble that a lot of us seem to be having in rethinking a coherent defense 
posture for this great nation, I suspect, really stems from the trouble we're having 
shaking off the spell of Camelot. Who in this room, for example, can forget the exhilarati-
on on hearing John F. Kennedy's great declaration: "We shall pay any price, bear any 
burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and 
the success of liberty." 
But that was in 1961, and the ensuing decade has made it abudantly clear that we 
will not pay any price. 
-we will not bear any burden 
-we will not meet any hardship 
-and most certainly we will not oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of 
liberty, at least as liberty is defined and practiced in Vietnam, Cambodia, or for that 
matter, Greece. 
In 1970, the new doctrine was articulated by President Nixon thus: "(My) central ~ 
thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of 
allies and friends, but that America cannot-and will not-conceive all the plans, design 
all the programs, execute all the defense of the free nations of the world." 
So we begin to talk about "fly before buy" and "design to cost". 
If top management in defense industry is confused and whiplashed by the contradictions 
in our defense policies, it's probably because, at bottom, our defense policies don't 
accord with our diplomatic initiatives and, indeed, as time goes by seem to be diverging 
ever further apart. 
But what's a joint chief to do when he doesn't know from one day to the next on 
what continent he's to be fighting in defense of what kind of liberty, whether it will be 
in a jungle swamp, frozen tundra, or high sierra, against sophisticated mechanized armies 
supported by nuclear weapons, or guerrilla bands armed only with AK 47s? He's going to 
ask for more, that's what he's going to do. 
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And so words like "back-up" and "redundancy" crop up in the jargon emanating from 
the Pentagon. "Redundancy" has a nicer lilt to it than "duplication" which, as everybody 
knows, is wasteful. So's "back-up" of course, but if you can remove the customary 
connotation, with any luck and a good P.R. staff you can convince civilians that it's 
actually a military virtue. 
Ergo, to assure nuclear deterrence we need a "triad of forces." That is, if the 
Minuteman missile fails, for some ungodly reason to exit its silo when the button is 
pushed, we need Poseidon submarines at sea to go after the same target. And if both 
fail, we need to send a manned strategic bomber to do the job. 
If all three work as planned, however, which even I concede is possible, we need 
~ special staff of high-ranking admirals and generals to keep the same target from being 
eliminated not twice over, but thrice over. And that, of course, is what we've got in 
the Joint Strategic Targeting and Planning Staff situated in a deep hole out in 
Nebraska. 
Industrial management feels the backlash of all this in responding to Requests for 
Proposals ("RFP's") which issue from the Pentagon from time to time for super-sophisticated 
hardware. And even if it's for an air defense missile systems that will engage 50 
targets simultaneously on the move and throw rocks when it runs out of missiles, some 
contractor will bid on it. And even though the missile performs superbly in user 
tests, when the rock ejector jams, there is consternation, recrimination and hard 
feelings all around-and the Congressman who reads the GAO report and rushes to expose 
the foul-up gains another headline. 
I admire the fortitude and endurance of contractors who persist in the competition. 
In my own district I have had a case in whcih the plans, specifications, and assorted 
forms given to a prospective producer of a very simple flat felt washer weighed 7~ 
pounds-and a lot of it was microfilm. 
The problem of course, is not exclusively of the Pentagon's own making: we in 
Congress and you in industry share culpability in the unwieldy, cumbersome and inefficient 
structure which has been achieved. So where do we go from here? 
I do not believe we can or should greatly reduce defense spending. 
I do not believe that our active duty military establishment is too large. 
I do not believe our active duty military establishment is too strong. 
What I do believe is that it is too fat and that - it is high time that we consider 
not only the cost of our military establishment but also where the money is being spent 
and the relationship of this spending to today's realities, not those of Camelot. 
First, in the strictly physical sense, the entire United States military establishment 
is larded-and I use the word advisedly-with both officers and enlisted men whose 
personal physical condition is such that their presence in our military establishment 
contributes to its weakness and not to its strength. We have air-conditioned them 
and tnner-springed them and foam rubbered them and ice-creamed them to the point where 
a 10-mile hike would be an insurmountable burden for far too many of our military. 
The fat in our military is, of course, demonstrated in another way, and that is in 
our grade structure. It is too large in generals and admirals, lieutenant generals and 
vt ce admirals, major generals, brigadier generals and rear admirals, colonels and Navy 
c~tains, major and lieutenant commanders. It is not too large in captains, first and 
second lieutenants, lieutenant j.g. and ensigns in the Navy. And the same imbalance 
holds true in the enlisted ranks. 
The ratio of officers to enlisted men was one officer for every 7 and one-half 
enlisted men only five years ago. Today it is one officer for every 6 enlisted men. 
That trend will continue until someone with authority to make it stick says "no". 
Perhaps the greatest mistake Congress has nLade has been in lacking the intestinal 
fortitude to say "no" to the all volunteer Army when it was proposed by the Administration 
and when we believed it wouldn't work. You are all familiar with what we have done in 
increasing military pay to attract volunteers and to keep him in the service. 
This is why there isn't any money left for research, and this why there isn't any 
money left for development, and this is why there isn't any money left for procurement, 
and this is why there isn't any money left for operations, and this is why our military 
is drowning in fat as well as in paper. 
It is time-it is long past time that we changed our thinking. We have looked backward 
for our threats and it's time we looked forward. If we are going to look backward 
anywhere, let's look backward to the toughness and leanness and manness of the military 
establishment we used to have and can have again if only some tough mean people in 
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the Pentagon and some tough mean people in industry and some tough mean people in 
Congress would only have the guts to say "no" once in a while." 
(Editorial Comment and Feature taken from July 1973issue of the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL.) 
FEATURE: HOUSE PANEL WANTS MORE F-l11s, CUTS F-15 BUY IN HALF. 
'kajor shift in FY 74 USAF aircraft procurements from those recommended by the Pentagon 
are in store, if the House Armed Services Committee's mark up of the DoD procurement 
authorization bill is upheld by the rest of Congress. 
Changes which the House panel voted to make on 19 and 20 June, when it began its 
annual mark up of Dod's procurement and R&D requests, would: 
.Continue F-lll production. Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements decided 
recently not to keep the F-lll line open with a new buy. The line is scheduled to shut 
down in December of 1974 when the last of 550 aircraft now programmed will be delivered. 
Although the Administration did not request them in either year, Congress directed in 
FY 72 and FY 73 that F-ilis continue to be built, funding 12 each year. In FY 73, 
another $30-million was voted for long lead time parts against a "possible buy" in 
FY 7~) but DoD has refused to release the money. Some feel the Air Force has not 
been enthusiastic about buying more because of concern that it could somehow jeopardize 
the future of the B-1 bomber. But production of the strategic version of the F-lll 
ceased some time ago; the only line now open is for the Tactical Air Command version. 
One of the committee's concerns about stopping the F-lll buy at this juncture is that 
the new aircraft approved to rejuvenate the Tactical Air Command-the F-15 and A-I0 close 
support aircraft-are still unproven, whereas the F-l11 is proven, it is not a "vintage" 
system, and would not have a "warm production line" if either the F-15 or A-I0 ran into 
problems or delays as they enter service. (Representative Samuel Stratton (D-NY) said 
the USAF/Clements decision was 'both stupid and wasteful and should not be tolerated by 
the taxpayers.") 
The 425 F-ilis bought for TAC provide only 137 extra planes to support its four 
wing operational force. This leaves a margin of only 48% for attrition replacement, 
combat crew readiness training and maintenance pipeline. By comparison, the F-4E buy 
provides a margin of 80%, the A-7 buy a margin of 77% and the F-15 buy (510 aircraft to 
support 288 at squadron level) gives a margin of 75 percent. Without an additional buy, 
TAC's F-lll force would drop to 3 effective wings in 1979 and to only 1 in 1982 (March 
AFJ). The committee voted to fund 12 new planes at about $126-million. 
Support for the House action is sure to come from the House Appropriations Committee, 
which told Clements, after he announced his decision not buy more, to not divert the $30 
million which had been voted for the possible follow-on buy. The panel said it wanted 
another chance to review the program. Similar support is also likely from the Senate 
Armed Services Committee; the outlook from the Senate Appropriations Committee is 
uncertain. 
·Impound A-I0 production funds until the new close support aircraft has passed all 
of its R&D milestones. DoD's ¥y Z4 budget included $112.4-million for development and 
$30-million to buy long lead time production components. The House panel voted to require 
that the latter money not be released until the committee is shown data that the Air Force 
plane and its new General Electric 30mm GAU-8/A cannon are ready for operational servic 
The GE gun was selected for final development over a Philco Ford entry on 14 June after 
a three month "shoot out" at Eglin AFB. 
·Cut the Air Force's F-15 fighter buy in half. The panel is concerned about recent 
failures of the aircraft's Pratt & Whitney FI00PW-I00 engine during its qualification 
tests. More than "sixty deficiencies have yet to be corrected, one panel member told 
AFJ, and he said the committee feels there is no need to build production up so fast 
until the engine is fully proven. Last year, the first 30 production F-15s were funded 
at $453.6-million, including spares, plus another $454.5-million for research and 
development. 
·The current budget request, which the House panel has voted to cut, would fund 77 
more planes at almost a billion dollars, not including another $229.5-million for R&D. 
The total FY 74 funding request is $1.148-billion. Maj. Gen Benjamin Bellis, USAF 
F-15 Program Director, recently told a group of journalists that the plane's target 
cost is still $10.4-million per copy and that the first production models are "under 
target". 
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Continue Navy F-14 production, including funds for a "fly off" between stripped 
down versions of the F-14, General Dynamics' YF-16, F-4N, and a "tail hook" version 
of the F-15 to fill out Navy/Marine Corps fighter requirements after a joint buy of 
313 Phoenix-carrying F-14s is completed. Fifty F-14s would be funded. Clements has 
proposed in FY 74, another 50 each in FY 75 and FY 76 and 29 more in FY 77. The Marine 
Corps would get roughly every fourth one of these aircraft, enough for four squadrons-but 
not enough for any attrition allo~ance. 
Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), in a Navy hearing before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on 19 June, complained that the F-14 had been "shoved down the throats" of the 
Marine Corps to lower the F-14's cost to the Navy. (The Marine Corps had sought to buy 
~131-million worth of F-4Js, but Navy CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt told Congress it was a 
- ;bad decision" and succeeded in getting Navy Secretary John Warner and Clements to have 
the Marine Corps "reconsider" its choice of planes.) 
Under current thinking, 313 F-14As would be bought in all. Including R&D, this 
program would cost out at $6.02-billion, $19.2-million per plane, compared with earlier 
estimates totaling $5.26-billion or $16.8-million per plane. Clements has told Congress 
that a decision on what follow-on plane to but-a non-Phoenix carrying F-14D or one of 
the other candidates to be tested in the fly-off-would be made in July of 1976. 
Clements has estimated that Grumman will lose about $100-million on the F-14 contract, 
but expressed concern that Grumman's cost cutting efforts and management still need to 
be improved. But neither he nor Zumwalt addressed the fac t that Grumman's work accounts 
for only about 25% of the plane's cost. Subcontractors account for another 25% and the 
plane's weapons and fire control system entail the other 50%. Senator Barry Goldwater 
(R-Ariz.) has long expressed his frustration at getting F-14 cost data from the Navy, 
finally forced an estimate last March that the Phoenix missile and its AN/AWG-9 fire 
control system would come out to at least $7.62-million per plane. Each Phoenix missile 
costs about $453,000, the AWG-9 $3.56-million. 
Not to fund USAF A-7 production. On 20 June, the House panel defeated by a substantial 
24 to 8 record vote a proposal to continue production of the Air Force A-7, although no 
such funds had been requested by the Air Force. The Navy, however, is buying 42 A-7E 
Corsair lIs in FY 74 at a cost of $190.1-million, including initial spares. 
No major funding changes, AFJ has learned, are expected on the Air Force B-1 Strategic 
bomber, for which $473.5-million is budgeted. Similarly, the Navy's CVN-70 nuclear 
carrier (657.0-million) and new Trident sub ($1.176-billion) are expected to undergo 
only minor funding revisions from the House group. Although strong fights are expected 
on the floor of the House attempting to cut those three programs, they are not expected 
to result in significant changes from what the Armed Services Committee is recommending. 
(Reprinted with the permission of the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL.) 
SERVICE NOTE: F-14A CRASH 
Navy/Grumman F-14A variable-geometry air-superiority fighter crashed last week about 
60 mi. off Pt. Mugu, Calif., following an apparent ejector malfunction in the test launch 
of a Raytheon Sparrow air-to-air missile. Both Grumman crewmember.s ejected successfully 
and were recovered by a Navy helicopter. 
Aircraft at the time was flying in a zero-g condition at an altitude of 5,000 ft. and 
a speed of Mach 0.95. Test called for a Sparrow to be launched from the aft semi-
submerged missile station along the fuselage centerline located just forward of the tail 
hook. 
The missile was launched, the crew felt a thud against the fuselage and 
the Sparrow porpoising forward of the aircraft, with its top fins missing. 
followed by an explosion and fires on board the F-14, which then pitched up 
angle. At this point, the crew ejected. 
then saw 
This was 
to a 70-deg. 
On separation, the Sparrow is programmed to eject with a nosedown pitch of 13-15 deg. 
Movies and telemetry data indicate that this particular missile ejected in a level 
position, puncturing a fuselage fuel tank before falling away. 
(Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 25, 1973) 
